The European Union as a Normative Power : A Response to Thomas Diez by Manners, Ian
Millennium
 166
Response
 167
The European Union as a Normative 
Power: A Response to Thomas Diez 
Ian Manners1 
In his recent article in Millennium 33, no. 3 (2005), Thomas 
Diez’s reconsideration of the Normative Power (NP) thesis 
raises a number of important questions about the European 
Union (EU) as a normative power in world politics. His article 
critically problematises NP and calls for ‘a greater degree of 
self-reflexivity’ in discussions and representations of the EU as 
a NP. This response to Diez’s article will develop the thesis of 
the EU as an NP by primarily addressing his main argument 
that: ‘the EU is not the first normative power, and self/other 
practices … can be observed in other historical instances, 
notably the United States’ and his two minor arguments: that 
‘the concept of ‘normative power’, rather than being distinct 
from ‘civilian power’, is already embedded in the latter’; and 
‘the discourse on ‘normative power Europe’ is an important 
practice of European identity construction’. It will be argued 
that the EU as an NP is different from great powers and 
distinctive from civilian power. But Diez’s reconsideration does 
raise a number of interesting questions of the EU selves in both 
‘othering’ practices and reflexivity.  
[T]he effort to construct the European Union … is a global civilising 
effort. This is so because the coordination of European differences 
(taking all domains together) – or its failure – will prefigure the 
constitution of still larger groupings, in which more marked economic, 
cultural, and religious differences will have to be reconciled in order 
to take part in the dynamics of globalisation of ways of life that 
follows from the dynamics of production, commerce, and the media 
in which the greater part of humanity is now engaged.2
____________
1. I am very grateful to Giovanna Bono, David Chandler, Thomas Diez, 
Geoffrey Edwards, Simon Lightfoot, two anonymous referees, and the editors of 
Millennium for their helpful comments.
2. Julia Kristeva, ‘Europe Divided: Politics, Ethics, Religion’, in Crisis of the 
European Subject (New York: Other Press, 2000), 114–15.
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In many respects, the Normative Power (NP) thesis was written in a 
different era to the one in which we now live. Imagined in the 1990s 
and first written during the years 1999–2000, Normative Power Europe: A 
Contradiction in Terms? reflected the crystallisation of the European Union 
(EU) at the end of the twentieth century.3 It was, and is, a statement of 
what is believed to be good about the EU; a statement which needed 
to be made in order to stimulate and reflect on what the EU should be 
(doing) in world politics.4 As Julia Kristeva also argued in 2000, the 
construction of the EU is not just a European project – it is part of a global 
effort to coordinate and reconcile human differences under conditions of 
globalisation. This effort has become all the more important to humanity 
since the events of 11 September 2001. 
Based on research into symbolic and normative discourses and 
practices within the EC/EU during the 1990s, the phrase ‘normative 
power’ was used as a response to the relative absence of normative 
theorising and to promote normative approaches to the EU.5 As Thomas 
Diez has recently suggested, ‘normative power is a power that is able 
“to shape conceptions of the ‘normal’”. We can therefore identify such a 
normative power by the impact it has on what is considered appropriate 
behaviour by other actors.’6 Just to contextualise this concept, it had 
become increasingly clear during the 1990s that the changed global 
conditions and the European integration process were constructing the 
EU’s ‘international identity’ in world politics.7 Although only part of 
its international identity, the ‘normative’ power of the EU was seen as 
being distinct from the pre-existing European ideal types of ‘civilian’ 
vs ‘military’ power.8 In contrast to previously empirical accounts of the 
EC/EU in world politics, from the late 1990s onwards the study of EU 
____________
3. Ian Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? 
(Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Working Paper 38-2000). 
[http://www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI_publications/COPRI_publications /
publications/38-2000.doc].
4. Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal 
of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235–58.
5. Manners (2000) Normative Power Europe; and Ian Manners, Substance and 
Symbolism: An Anatomy of Cooperation in the New Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).
6. Thomas Diez, ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 
‘Normative Power Europe’’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 
(2005): 613–36, 615.
7. Richard Whitman, From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International 
Identity of the European Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); Ian Manners 
and Richard Whitman, ‘Towards Identifying the International Identity of the 
European Union: A Framework for Analysis of the EU’s Network of Relations’, 
Journal of European Integration 21, no. 2 (1998): 231–49; Ian Manners and Richard 
Whitman, ‘The “Difference Engine”: Constructing and Representing the 
International Identity of the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy 
10, no. 3 (2003): 380–404.
8.Manners (2002) ‘Normative Power Europe’, 236–8; Manners and Whitman, 
‘The “Difference Engine”’, 387–91.
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foreign policy became more informed by social constructivist theory, 
accommodating ideas about the EU’s international identity.9
As Diez’s reconsideration of the NP thesis illustrates, the 
development of constuctivist theory-informed EU external/foreign 
policy studies has led to a wider engagement with the NP approach. 
These include book-length volumes using the NP approach to study EU 
foreign policy10; EU actorness11; the Euro-Mediterranean partnership12; 
EU values and principles13. In addition to these volumes, work on 
international political theory14; global governance15; environmental 
studies research16; the transatlantic relationship17; and Turkish security 
studies have also used the NP approach.18
____________
9. Knud Erik Jørgensen, ed., Reflective Approaches to European Governance 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997); Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The 
European Union as Global Actor (London: Routledge, 1999); Ian Manners and 
Richard Whitman, eds., The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); Karen Smith, European Union 
Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003); Michael E. 
Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Walter Carlsnaes, Helene 
Sjursen, and Brian White, eds., Contemporary European Foreign Policy (London: 
Sage, 2004); Ole Elgström and Michael Smith (eds.) The European Union’s Roles in 
International Politics (London: Routledge, 2006).
10. Zaki Laïdi, La norme sans la force: L’énigme de la puissance européenne (Paris: 
Presses de Sciences Po, 2005); Helene Sjursen, ed., Special Issue: ‘What Kind of 
Power? European Foreign Policy in Perspective’, Journal of European Public Policy 
13, no. 2 (2006).
11. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 
2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2006).
12. Emanuel Adler, Beverly Crawford, Federica Bicci, and Raffaella Del Sarto, 
eds., The Convergence of Civilizations? Constructing a Mediterranean Region (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2006).
13. Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners, eds., Values and Principles in European 
Union Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2006).
14. Andrew Linklater, ‘A European Civilising Process?’, in International Relations 
and the European Union, eds. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 367–87.
15. Pascal Lamy and Zaki Laïdi (2002) ‘A European Approach to Global 
Governance’, Progressive Politics 1, no. 1 (2002): 56–63; Sibylle Scheipers and 
Daniela Sicurelli, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Credible Utopia’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies (2006) forthcoming.
16. Simon Lightfoot and Jon Burchell, ‘The European Union and the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development: Normative Power Europe in Action?’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies 43, no. 1 (2005): 75–95.
17. Kalypso Nicolaïdis, ‘The Power of the Superpowerless’, in Beyond Paradise 
and Power: Europeans, Americans and the Future of a Troubled Partnership, ed. Tod 
Lindberg (London: Routledge, 2004), 93–120.
18. Tarik Oguzlu, ‘An Analysis of Turkey’s Prospective Membership in the 
European Union from a “Security” Perspective’, Security Dialogue 34, no. 3 (2003): 
285–99.
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Diez’s Millennium article critically problematises NP and calls for ‘a 
greater degree of self-reflexivity’ in discussions and representations of 
the EU as a NP. This response to Diez’s article will develop the thesis 
of the EU as an NP in world politics by addressing his main claim that 
‘the EU is not the first normative power, and ‘self’/‘other’ practices … 
can be observed in other historical instances, notably in the practices of 
the United States.’19 In addition the response will address two of Diez’s 
other claims: that ‘the concept of ‘normative power’, rather than being 
distinct from ‘civilian power’, is already embedded in the latter’; and 
‘the discourse on ‘normative power Europe’ is an important practice 
of European identity construction.’20 It will be argued that the EU as an 
NP is different from great powers and distinctive from civilian power. But 
Diez’s reconsideration does raise a number of interesting questions of the 
EU selves in both ‘othering’ practices and reflexivity. 
The Difference between the EU and ‘Other’ Powers 
Diez’s main substantive claim is that ‘the notion of normative power is 
hardly novel and unique to the EU’, and in particular compares the EU 
to the USA.21 As stated in the NP thesis, ‘[f]rom a relativist viewpoint it 
might be suggested that the EU is simply promoting its own norms in a 
similar manner to historical empires and contemporary global powers.’22 
However, instead of engaging in such relativist reasoning, it was argued 
that the ‘EU has gone further towards making its external relations 
informed by, and conditional on, a catalogue of norms which come closer 
to those of the European convention on human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and the universal declaration of human rights than most other 
actors in world politics.’23 Diez raises an important question of how to 
judge whether a normative power is both normative and powerful. He 
usefully suggests that this can be judged on the basis of two factors: the 
role of universal norms ‘as an aim as well as the means for the projection 
of power’; and ‘how far military power dominates other forms of 
power.’24 Factor one relates to the distinction between EU normative 
power where the reference points for universal norms are external 
to the power, and more particular normative power where reference 
points are internal.25 This distinction is related, but not identical, to the 
difference between cosmopolitan and communitarian normative theory. 
Two further factors help judge normative power – whether the exercise 
____________
19. Diez, ‘Constructing the Self’, 635.
20. Ibid.
21. Diez, ‘Constructing the Self’, 620–3.
22. Manners (2002) ‘Normative Power Europe’, 240.
23. Ibid., 241.
24. Diez, ‘Constructing the Self’, 620.
25. Clearly, the idea of ‘universal’ is problematic, but is understood here as 
particular/culture transcending norms such as human rights, justice, and human 
dignity that are found in generally agreed statements of principle such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See Gillian Triggs, ‘Remembering the 
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of normative power transcends or reinforces the status quo of iniquitous 
and historically determined power and justice in world politics. And 
thus, by implication, whether the exercise of normative power transcends 
the source of that power – i.e. does exercising normative power based on 
the universal claims of external reference points lead to the strengthening 
of the external at the expense of the power? These four factors will be 
used to judge whether the EU is similar to other historical empires and 
contemporary global powers, or whether it is more normative than most 
other actors in world politics. 
The claim that the EU represents a normative power in world 
politics was made with reference to the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
in the case of human rights.26 Clearly, human rights is just one case (out 
of nine), so a fuller picture needs to reflect on the extent to which the 
reference points for these other norms are also external to the EU. In the 
case of ‘peace’ the primary reference point is the 1945 United Nations 
Charter, together with references to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and 
the objectives of the 1990 Paris Charter.27 In the cases of the norms of 
‘liberty/freedom’, ‘democracy’; ‘human rights’, and ‘rule of law’ the 
primary external reference point is the Council of Europe’s (CoE) 1950 
ECHR, together with the CoE’s 1997 Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.28 
Interestingly, there is also an internal reference point in the shape of ‘the 
constitutional conditions common to the member states.’29 In the case 
of ‘equality’ the two primary external reference points are the ECHR 
and the CoE’s European Social Charter (revised 1996). These draw on 
secondary reference points found in articles 1 and 7 of the UDHR, and 
article 26 of the UN’s 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. Internal reference points for equality include Articles 2, 3, and 
141 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), the EC’s 
1989 Community Charter on the Fundamental Rights of Workers, and 
European Court of Justice case law.30 In the case of ‘social solidarity’ 
the primary external reference points are the UN’s 1966 International 
____________
Life of Edward Said: A Tribute’, Ejournalist 3 (2003), [www.ejournalism.au.com/
ejournalist/triggs.pdf]; and Sharin Ebadi, ‘Human Rights Embody the 
Fundamental Values of Human Civilizations’, UN Human Development Report 
2004 (New York: UNDP, 2004), 23.
26. Manners (2002) ‘Normative Power Europe’, 241.
27. See Article 11, Treaty on European Union (TEU); Articles I-3, I-41, and III-
292, Constitution for Europe (CfE).
28. See Article 6, TEU; Article I-9, CfE; EU Council of Ministers, The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Brussels: Council of Ministers, 2000); 
European Parliament, ‘Human Rights – Fundamental Rights’, Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (Brussels: European Parliament, 2000) 
[www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/human_rights/default_en.htm].
29. See Article 6, TEU; and Article I-9, CfE.
30. Council of Ministers, Charter of Fundamental Rights; and European 
Parliament, ‘Human Rights – Fundamental Rights’.
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the CoE’s 1961 
European Social Charter, together with the EC’s 1989 Community 
Charter on the Fundamental Rights of Workers (internal reference point). 
In the case of ‘sustainable development’ the reference points include 
principle 1 of the 1992 UNTAD Rio Declaration, the 1992 UN Framework 
Convention of Climate Change (FCCC), and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to 
the FCCC. Finally, in the case of ‘good governance’ the external reference 
points are ‘the principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law’ in order to ‘promote an international system based on stronger 
multilateral cooperation and good global governance.’31 The details of 
____________
31. See Article III-292, CfE.
32. Ratification of cosmopolitan international law treaties includes eight ILO 
treaties; nine human rights treaties; seven humanitarian laws; and six 
environmental laws.  The maximum number of treaties is 30. Based on UN 
Human Development Report 2005 (New York: UNDP, 2005), 289–92; 320–7; and 
Figure 1 Cosmopolitan international law treaties, 200532 
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what constitutes good governance (i.e. the participation of civil society 
in order to encourage openness and transparency, as well as to facilitate 
democratic participation) refers to internal reference points (including 
Art. I-50, CfE). To get a sense of the extent to which the reference point for 
the NP thesis relies on external claims, in particular through international 
law (Diez’s ‘self-binding’), it is worth comparing the EU’s member states 
with the largest states in the world. 
As this comparative chart illustrates, the member states of the EU lead 
the world in ratifying cosmopolitan international treaties. In comparison, 
the USA has trailed the rest of the world badly in terms of ratifying such 
international law treaties. Clearly, ratification of international treaties 
says very little about standards and implementation (Cambodia ratified 
the Convention on Genocide in 1950), but they are important symbolic 
and public demonstrations of international commitment which may 
prove more important than was originally intended. What the chart 
suggests is that the pooling of sovereignty has made EU member states 
more accepting of external cosmopolitan international law treaties.33
The second factor is that of military power, which has been covered 
extensively elsewhere in debates between armies of academics, set 
off by exchanges between Cooper, Kagan, Patten, Powell, Rumsfeld, 
Solana, et al.34 Based on external reference points to the NP thesis, it is 
manifestly not the case that ‘most of the US’s international engagement 
has had strong normative under-, if not over-tones.’35 Undoubtedly, 
the impact of Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt between 1941 (‘The Four 
Freedoms’) and 1948 (UDHR) led to the USA having a strong normative 
international presence. But the series of international institutions that 
were created tended to reinforce, not transform, international relations, 
in particular by sustaining the hegemony of the imperial powers in the 
UN Security Council, and ensuring other UN organs reflected US power 
(for example the IMF, IBRD, and GATT). Despite a gradual involvement 
in military power (WEU actions, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Congo), the 
EU’s normative power has, so far, predetermined its exercise of physical 
force. This is clearly not the case for the USA, where the technologies 
of its complex, industrialised military have regularly pre-determined 
both the objectives and strategies of US power – ‘shock and awe’ 
democratisation included. This leads me to a third factor in judging 
normative power – the concept of ‘exceptionalism’. 
____________
Mary Kaldor, et al., eds., Global Civil Society 2005/6 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 358–65.
33. Jeremy Rabkin, ‘Is EU Policy Eroding the Sovereignty of Non-Member 
States?’, Chicago Journal of International Law 1, no. 2 (2000): 273–90; and Ian Ward, 
‘The End of Sovereignty and the New Humanism’, Stanford Law Review 55 (2003): 
2091–112.
34. See also Ian Manners, ‘The Value of Peace’, in Values in the Constitution 
of Europe, ed. Miriam Aziz and Susan Millns (London: Dartmouth, 2006); and 
Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe Reconsidered’.
35. Diez, ‘Constructing the Self’, 621.
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The concept of American ‘exceptionalism’ is helpful in assessing its 
normative power. The concept of exceptionalism encourages us to judge 
whether a claim to normative power is based on cosmopolitan normative 
theory (‘we are all equal’) or not. Thus, a claim of exceptionalism located 
in communitarian self-understanding would seem to be one which 
cannot be shared with the rest of the world on an equal and just basis. 
But what if universal norms are being propagated in a normative project 
based not on exceptionalism, but on ordinariness as in the case of the EU? 
Undoubtedly, there are claims of ‘normative power Europe’ that have 
been used by EU politicians in a communitarian attempt to legitimise the 
EU project to member states and citizens. Similarly references to certain 
constitutive norms, such as social solidarity, sustainable development 
and good governance, may be desirable for the many, but not for those 
who profit from inequality, pollution and corruption. From a relativist 
perspective it could be argued that all ‘particularist’ claims to normative 
power are relatively similar – from the American and French revolutions 
to those of the Russian revolution. It is the lack of exceptionalism, 
rather than the claim to being special, which characterises most of the 
normative claims in the EU – particularly those located in past European 
failures and crimes (such as colonialism, nationalism, world wars, the 
holocaust and inequality). Generally implicit in any EU claims to being 
sui generis are built on humility for historical failures such as injustice, 
intolerance, and inhumanity.36 As we discuss in the next section, this 
historical context of reflexive humility and attempts to build non-
hierarchical relationships contribute to normative power. The stark 
contrast between the EU and US claims to exceptionalism could not be 
clearer in discussions of the ‘god-given duty’ of the American dream, 
where the USA is ‘the land of the free and the home of the brave’.37
The fourth factor used in judging a claim to normative power is 
based on Etienne Balibar’s notion of Europe as a ‘vanishing mediator’. 
Balibar takes Fredric Jameson’s ‘vanishing mediator’ a step further by 
giving it the meaning of an EUtopia or myth where the EU becomes the 
anti-systemic mediator – ‘a transitory institution, force, community … 
that creates the conditions for a new society by rearranging the elements 
inherited from the very institution that has to be overcome.’38 In contrast 
to the concept of exceptionalism, the extent to which the EU becomes a 
‘vanishing mediator’ helps to judge the claim to normative power. If the 
successful exercise of normative power with reference to external points 
of international reference (such as the UN) leads to a more universal 
acceptance of those norms, then the expectation would be that the EU 
____________
36. John Erik Fossum, ‘Conceptualizing the European Union Through Four 
Strategies of Comparison’, Comparative European Politics 4, no 1 (2006): 94-123.
37. Diez, ‘Constructing the Self’, 621. See also Seymour Martin Lipset, American 
Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 1996).
38. Etienne Balibar, ‘Europe: Vanishing Mediator’, Constellations 10, no. 3 (2003): 
312–38.
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would become less, not more powerful. It would, in effect, increasingly 
vanish through its mediation. This is not to say that the EU, nor its 
member states, regions, and localities, would vanish as institutions, 
but that they would become less powerful as forces of change as they 
would become, quite simply, normal in the multi-layered processes of 
post-national politics. As Kalypso Nicolaïdis puts it, the EU ‘would 
preferably not refer to itself in terms of power at all, but as an intervener, 
a global partner, a ‘vanishing mediator’.39 Diez’s two examples of US 
‘particular’ normative power, Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points and 
post-Second World War international institutions, tended to amplify 
rather than reduce the USA’s impact in international relations, at least 
during the Cold War.40 
The Difference between Normative Power and Civilian Power 
In arguing that the concepts of normative power and civilian power 
are ‘very close’ to each other, Diez suggests a ‘reductionist reading’ 
of civilian power.41 Given the manifold and moving interpretations of 
civilian power, the NP thesis engaged with what are considered to be 
the core nodal points of these discussions – ‘diplomatic cooperation to 
solve international problems’ (multilateralism); ‘centrality of economic 
power’ (non-military); and ‘legally-binding supranational institutions’ 
(international law).42 The writings of François Duchêne, Kenneth 
Twitchett, Gunnar Sjöstadt, and Hans Maull suggest that these core 
points have been constitutive of civilian power resources, objectives, and 
strategies. In response to Diez’s concerns, it will be argued that there are 
least six distinctions to be made between civilian power and normative 
power in a consideration of the EU.43
First, there is the obvious post-colonial concern that civilian power 
Europe is read as a neocolonial attempt to ‘civilise’ the world (again). As 
Diez’s article illustrates, many still endorse the role of civilian power in 
acting ‘in the name of a civilisation of international relations’ through 
‘the EU’s biggest project of all, its mission civilisatrice.’44 The NP thesis is 
an attempt to escape civilising missions by countering the neocolonial 
discourses of claims implicit (or explicit) in civilian power. Secondly, 
most civilian power formulations place an emphasis on the importance 
of being ‘long on economic power’ or ‘the concentration on nonmilitary, 
primarily economic, means’.45 Civilian power writings tend to place 
____________
39. Nicolaïdis, ‘The Power of the Superpowerless’, 117.
40. Diez, ‘Constructing the Self’, 621.
41. Ibid., 617.
42. Manners (2000) Normative Power Europe, 26; Manners (2002) ‘Normative 
Power Europe’, 236–7.
43. See Manners (2002) ‘Normative Power Europe’, 238; Manners and Whitman, 
‘The “Difference Engine”’, 390.
44. Diez, ‘Constructing the Self’, 617 and 629.
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much importance on non-military or economic resources, objectives, and 
strategies. It is clearly no accident that most civilian power writing has 
been about some of the wealthiest places in the world (1970s Western 
Europe, 1990s Japan and Germany). The emphasis on material assets and 
physical power in civilian power approaches contrasts with the emphasis 
on the normative power of non-material exemplification found in the 
contagion of norms through imitation (mimŽtisme) and attraction. 
Thirdly, civilian power writings emphasise the communitarian 
nature of civilian resources, objectives, and strategies – that civilian 
power is exercised primarily for the benefit of those exercising it. The 
communitarian aspect of civilian power is compounded by the turn taken 
by Maull and others to apply civilian power to Germany and Japan (let 
alone the USA), with references to ‘national goals’, ‘national interest’, and 
‘national values’. This has led to civilian power becoming far too related to 
the ontology of states, rather than to a ‘style of action’ or ‘domestication’. 
In contrast, the NP approach emphasises the cosmopolitan nature of 
EU normative power, in particular through ‘a commitment to placing 
universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with its 
member states and the world.’46 Fourthly, civilian power writings have 
come to accept Westphalian cultural emphasis on international society 
as the form and means of world politics. Even Duchêne (in contrast to 
Shonfield), while talking about the transformation of world politics, 
was actually reinforcing the status quo of international relations with 
references to ‘international twentieth-century society’, ‘a powerful 
co-operative’, and ‘international open society’.47 This acceptance of 
Westphalian culturation, including the status quo of an international 
society between states, contrasts strongly with the NP approach of 
transcending the ‘normal’ of world politics through an emphasis on 
world society. 
Fifthly, civilian power writings reduce the notion of power to that of 
relations between agents, even if multilateral, non-military, legal relations. 
As Diez discusses in his article, normative power identifies the ambiguity 
of the EU as an actor/structure, to which is added relational/structural 
power.48 This is not to say that the EU does not act relationally, but that 
EU normative power reflects the structural elements of international 
relations that are powerfully changed by the EU’s mere existence – i.e. 
____________
45. François Duchêne, ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties 
of Interdependence’, in A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the 
Community, eds Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager (London: Macmillan, 
1973), 19; and Hanns Maull, ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, 
Foreign Affairs 69, no. 5 (1990), 92.
46. Manners (2002) ‘Normative Power Europe’, 241.
47. François Duchêne, ‘A New European Defense Community’, Foreign Affairs 
50, no. 1 (1971), 82; François Duchêne, ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, in Europe 
Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, ed. Richard Mayne (London: Fontana/
Collins, 1972), 47; and Duchêne, ‘The European Community’, 20.
48. Diez, ‘Constructing the Self’, 616.
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by exemplification rather than presumed ‘goal-driven instrumentalism’. 
Finally, if we take normative to mean should, ought, or good, this raises 
the question of what is normative about civilian power? Obviously 
within a Cold War nuclear-military superpower context, the aspiration 
to civilianise relations between member states through multilateral, non-
military, legal means was seen as a good thing. But beyond this context, 
after the Cold War, what is good for humanity about an EU civilian power 
that seeks to civilise, using materialist strategies, for self-interest, within 
a Westphalian culture? Developed as a response to the relative absence 
of normative theorising of, and to promote normative approaches to, the 
EU, the NP approach was part of an argument for moving away from 
Cold War (and neocolonial) approaches to the EU. 
The Self as Other and the International Identity of the EU 
Diez also argues that the discourse on normative power Europe involves 
practices of ‘othering’ as part of constructing the international identity of 
the EU. In his discussion of ‘the power of the “normative power Europe” 
discourse’, Diez argues that the NP approach is a practice of discursive 
representation rather than an objective category, and that this entails a 
second-order analysis of the power of this representation – an analysis of 
the ‘power acting upon power’ (Foucault).49 Diez’s argument regarding 
the need to study the power of normative power representations is clearly 
very important. However, three observations should be made regarding 
the way in which Diez constructs the ‘self’ of the EU – in particular 
with reference to Kristeva’s ‘self as other’, previous discussions of the 
‘international identity’ of the EU, as well as Habermas and Derrida’s 
‘practices of othering’. 
Abject. It is something rejected from which one does not part, from 
which one does not protect oneself as from an object … The abjection 
of Nazi crime reaches its apex when death, which, in any case, kills 
me, interferes with what, in my living universe, is supposed to save 
me from death: childhood, science, among other things.50 
The foreigner is within us. And when we flee from or struggle against 
the foreigner, we are fighting our unconsciousness – that ‘improper’ 
facet of our impossible ‘own and proper’ … To discover our disturbing 
otherness, for that indeed is what bursts in to confront that ‘demon’, 
that threat, that apprehension generated by the projective apparition 
of the other at the heart of what we persist in maintaining as a proper, 
solid ‘us’.51 
____________
49. Ibid., 626.
50. Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay in Abjection (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), 4.
51. Julia Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1991), 191–2.
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Diez argues that there are four strategies of constructing self and 
other found in ‘different forms of othering’.52 What is crucial for the 
understanding of the ‘self’ in the NP approach is that there is at least 
one more different form of othering – the self as other. As Julia Kristeva’s 
Lacanian psychoanalytically based work has illustrated over the past 
three decades, the other is always part of the self – an abject-foreigner 
which is part of our conscious and unconscious selves.53
  
To understand 
the way in which European selves are othered in abject-foreigners, it is 
worth briefly reflecting on recent EU-wide discourses surrounding far-
right coalition partners in government in Austria and Italy (together with 
election successes of the Front National in France and the Folkeparti in 
Denmark) and the rise of radical christian fundamentalism in the US. 
The reactions to Jörg Haider, Pia Kjærsgaard, Rocco Buttiglione, George 
W. Bush, and the hatred they attract are interesting exactly because of 
the ambiguity between abject-foreignness in questions of immigration, 
European integration, Christian fundamentalism, homophobia, and 
imperialism. The projection of otherness onto individuals and the social 
groups they represent is so strong precisely because they are also an 
abjected and disturbing part of ourselves. 
Thus, from the viewpoint of conventional work on identity, the 
notion of a difference engine reflects the attempts within the EU to 
engineer a single, essential, categorical identity which acts as a multiplier 
of differences between the EU and the world. However, critical social 
theory encourages us to analyse the International Identity of the EU 
as far more fluid, consisting of ongoing contestations of complex, 
multiple, relational identities. From this critical viewpoint the notion of 
a ‘difference engine’ is a means to analyse these ongoing contestations as 
part of the International Identity of the EU which does not add up to a 
single, integrating whole.54
A second observation concerns the way in which assumptions of 
an EU ‘self’ are structured – Diez sometimes writes of the EU as if it was 
a self which was capable of a strategy. As the quote from work on the 
‘international identity’ of the EU illustrates, there is no one EU identity 
– the EU cannot be considered a ‘difference engine’ in the multiplication 
of a separate, single, essential, categorical, supranational EU self. Diez’s 
observations regarding German, French and British aspects of EU identity 
reflect the ambiguity of the multiple identities which contest EU ‘selves’.55 
It is the fluid, complex, multiple and relational aspects of the self–other 
contestations which define the EU as a normative power, rather than the 
other way round. This self-pluralism makes it very difficult to crystallise 
either self or other consistently. Indeed, the fragmented nature of the nine 
constitutive norms identified in the NP approach make it absolutely clear 
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that contradictory multiplicity rather than ideology characterises the 
normative power of the EU. 
Thirdly, Diez’s argument on the practice of discursive representation 
in the NP thesis assumes that world politics and the EU might otherwise 
be innocent arenas. As stated from the outset of this response, it is argued 
that the EU represents a normative power, more so than most other 
actors in world politics. This is a normative claim with a normative 
aim, made in the relative absence of normative approaches to the EU. 
In his discussion of self-othering practices, Diez does not reflect on the 
way in which these practices are always present as part of human social 
existence. These practices are always for someone and for some purpose 
– our task, as political scientists, is to ensure we are critical (in the sense 
of challenging the prevailing order of the world) of othering practices 
based on essentialisms. If we accept that self-othering practices are 
always present, then we need to reflect on how these may best escape 
essentialist interpretations and lead to human emancipation. This aspect 
is left unstated in Diez’s discussions, potentially leading some to assume 
that had there not been an NP intervention, the EU could have gone on 
being the EU, innocent of all discursive practices. Were this the case, we 
might still be discussing the empirical capabilities–expectations gap, or 
perhaps the multi-level governance of external-foreign policies, rather 
than engaging in normative discussions of what the EU is and should be 
doing in world politics. 
Conclusion: Reflexive Reconsiderations of Normative Power 
Europe 
There is no essence of Europe, no fixed list of European values. There 
is no ‘finality’ to the process of European integration. Europe is a 
project of the future. With every decision, not only its zone of peace, 
its institutions, its political, economic and social order, but also its 
very identity and self-determination are opened for questioning and 
debate.56 
Thomas Diez’s reconsideration of the ‘normative power Europe’ approach 
is a welcome reflection on the extent to which it is good to argue the EU 
as a normative power in world politics. As argued above, Diez should 
perhaps reflect the means of judging the difference between the EU and 
other powers. In addition Diez might reconsider what is being reduced 
when distinguishing between civilian and normative power, as well as 
the self-othering in the international identity of the EU. The unfreezing 
of both the international order and the intellectual order in the post Cold-
War era has encouraged fundamentally different ways of conceiving and 
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understanding the EU in world politics. In this freer climate it is important 
to argue what is good, and reflect on what is bad, about the EU in world 
politics. One nihilist response to Diez’s (and others) criticisms might be 
simply not to pursue a normative approach. In this manner, it might be best 
to accept the EU and the world as we find them, and to focus on problem 
solving theory such as making the EU institutions work smoothly by 
dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble.57 But that would not 
be political science. Any political theory should not take EU institutions 
and relations with the world for granted, but should question what the 
EU is, what it does, and how we analyse these processes, and that is what 
the normative power approach seeks to do. 
In this respect, we should reflect on who and what the ‘self’ are 
in Diez’s discussions of self-othering and self-reflexivity. As the above 
extract from the concluding report of Romano Prodi’s Reflection Group 
on The Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe illustrates, there is no 
fixed, essential, final self in the processes of European integration. We are 
part of the questioning and debating, part of the selves in a project of the 
future. Without us, there will be no EU selves, no reflection, no reflexivity. 
Any and all of the norms discussed in the NP approach are not uniquely 
European, and neither is Europe itself. Claims made about relative EU 
attachment to a particular combination of normative principles largely 
reflect fairly recent (post-World War, post-Cold War) practices and 
constructions that can be undone as quickly as they have been achieved, 
unless there is constant, critical reflection. 
Reflexivity has a dual meaning in social science, involving both an 
understanding of the monitored character of social life, and the need 
for reflexive research characterised by interpretation and reflection.58 
This dual reading of reflexivity is taken seriously when it is argued that 
the NP thesis has ‘a normative quality to it – that the EU should act to 
extent its norms into the international system.’59 Understanding that our 
social life has a monitored character to it involves social reflection and 
readjustment. In this respect anyone arguing that the EU does ‘good’ in 
the world should cause us to engage in socially contextual consideration 
and contestation of this argument. Such engagement and reflexive 
reconsiderations are crucial to ensure that any global effort to coordinate 
and reconcile human differences is sustainable. 
Ian Manners is Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute 
for International Studies
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